Medical complicity and the legitimacy of practical authority. by Ehrenberg, Kenneth
Ethics, Medicine and Public Health
 
Medical Complicity and the Legitimacy of Practical Authority
--Manuscript Draft--
 
Manuscript Number:
Full Title: Medical Complicity and the Legitimacy of Practical Authority
Secondary Full Title: Complicité médicale et légitimité de l'autorité pratique
Article Type: Dossier / Philosophical considerations*
Section/Category: Philosophical foundations of bioethics
Corresponding Author: Kenneth M Ehrenberg
University of Surrey
Guildford, Please Choose UNITED KINGDOM
First Author: Kenneth M Ehrenberg
Order of Authors: Kenneth M Ehrenberg
Abstract: If medical complicity is understood as compliance with a directive to act against the
professional’s best medical judgment, the question arises whether it can ever be
justified. This paper will trace the contours of what would legitimate a directive to act
against a professional’s best medical judgment (and in possible contravention of her
oath) using Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority. The service conception is
useful for basing the legitimacy of authoritative directives on the ability of the
government to enable subjects to comply better with reasons that already apply to
them. Hence the service conception is basing the legitimacy of practical authority on a
certain kind of expertise. This helps to focus the conundrum regarding complicity on
the clash of expertise between the medical expert and the governing body tasked with
coordinating behaviour and otherwise devising rules for the social good. The ethical
dilemma presented by a hypothetically legitimate directive to act against a
professional’s best medical judgment also serves to highlight the moral dimension of
one’s duty to obey a legitimate authority.
Secondary Abstract: Si la complicité médicale est comprise comme le respect d’une directive visant à agir à
l’encontre du meilleur jugement médical du professionnel, la question se pose de
savoir si elle peut jamais être justifiée. Ce document tracera les contours de ce qui
légitimerait une directive visant à agir contre le meilleur jugement médical d’un
professionnel (et contrevenant éventuellement à son serment) en utilisant la
conception de l’autorité de Joseph Raz. La conception du service est utile pour fonder
la légitimité des directives faisant autorité sur la capacité du gouvernement à permettre
aux sujets de mieux se conformer aux raisons qui leur sont déjà applicables. Par
conséquent, la conception du service fonde la légitimité de l’autorité pratique sur un
certain type de compétences. Cela permet de centrer l'énigme en matière de
complicité sur le conflit d'expertise entre l'expert médical et l'instance dirigeante
chargée de coordonner le comportement et de définir par ailleurs des règles pour le
bien social. Le dilemme éthique présenté par une directive hypothétiquement légitime
visant à agir à l’encontre du meilleur jugement médical du professionnel sert
également à mettre en évidence la dimension morale de son devoir de respecter une
autorité légitime.
Keywords: Medical complicity, practical authority, Joseph Raz, legitimacy, moral duty
Secondary Keywords: Complicité médicale, autorité pratique, Joseph Raz, légitimité, devoir moral
Powered by Editorial Manager® and ProduXion Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation
Medical Complicity and the Legitimacy of Practical Authority 
Kenneth M Ehrenberg 
University of Surrey 
Author details, affiliations / Details des auteurs, coordonnees
  
Medical Complicity and the Legitimacy of Practical Authority 
 
If medical complicity is understood as compliance with a directive to act against the 
professional’s best medical judgment, the question arises whether it can ever be justified. This 
paper will trace the contours of what would legitimate a directive to act against a professional’s 
best medical judgment (and in possible contravention of her oath) using Joseph Raz’s service 
conception of authority. The service conception is useful for basing the legitimacy of 
authoritative directives on the ability of the putative authority to enable subjects to comply better 
with reasons that already apply to them. Hence the service conception bases the legitimacy of 
practical authority on a certain kind of greater knowledge or expertise. This helps to focus the 
conundrum regarding complicity on the clash of expertise between the medical expert and the 
governing body tasked with coordinating behaviour and otherwise devising rules for the social 
good. The ethical dilemma presented by a hypothetically legitimate directive to act against a 
professional’s best medical judgment also serves to highlight the moral dimension of one’s duty 
to obey a legitimate authority. 
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In most discussions of medical complicity (at least since World War II), the focus is on more 
egregious uses of medical skill in ways directly harmful to the patient.[1, 2, 3, 4] In more recent 
years, there has been an understandable focus on the participation of medical professionals in 
torture thought to be necessary to save large numbers of innocents, [5, 6, 7, 8] and on the force-
feeding of hunger strikers.[9, 10, 11] These cases are certainly more challenging to reach the 
morally correct conclusion than instances in which the medical professional is co-opted for 
inhumane experimentation or in a quest of enhancing harm for military success.[12, 13, 14, 15 
p3]  
However, if we are going to explore the moral contours of when such complicity might 
possibly be justified, we need an understanding of complicity that doesn’t automatically lead us 
to assume that no justification can be found. After all, if we define medical complicity in such a 
way that it is conceptually impossible to justify as a necessarily wrong act, we are begging the 
question of whether any government directive to act against the patient’s interests can be 
legitimate. Nevertheless, complicity clearly must involve some notion of moral compromise on 
the part of the medical professional, some contravention of the standard medical oath.1  
 For the purpose of this paper, I will define medical complicity as compliance with a 
demand that a medical professional act against her best medical judgment with regard to an 
actual or potential patient, where that demand is coming in the form of a lawful directive on the 
part of her legally constituted and recognized government. This understanding is in keeping with 
one made by Edmund Pellegrino, that the more morally problematic instances of such 
complicity were any instance in which the physician2 is required to use her medical knowledge 
                                                          
1 Since this paper may reach legal professionals and academics, I have been advised to include the caveat that we are 
not here talking about complicity as a concept or offense within criminal law, although there are some obvious areas 
of overlap.[16 p132] We are dealing specifically with complicity on the part of medical professionals with (we will 
assume) lawful directives of their otherwise legitimate governments. 
2 I will use ‘physician’ and ‘medical professional’ somewhat interchangeably. Of course, not all medical professionals 
are physicians, and there may be aspects of the moral calculation that are more applicable to physicians, and others 
more applicable to psychologists, nurses, paramedics, etc. Where these distinctions are relevant, they will be 
highlighted, but otherwise the two will be treated as equivalent. One additional factor we will discuss briefly is 
whether the medical professional has taken an oath not to do harm. 
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for a purpose other than the welfare of the patient.[13 p372-73]. This understanding clearly side-
lines some instances of concern, such as those in which the medical professional is faced with 
the question of whether to use medical knowledge obtained through past immoral actions for the 
benefit of the patient facing her. It also marginalizes instances where the medical professional is 
faced with a simple conflict between her medical duty and her own reasons of prudence. While 
some instances in which a government is demanding an act or information from a physician will 
be ones in which the government is making threats to the physician as well, we will assume that 
those threats do not themselves bear upon the morality of the decision the physician faces.3 The 
definition I suggest will help us to focus on the tension between what might be legitimate 
governmental interests and the interests of the patient facing the medical professional. 
 Our definition of complicity includes the stipulation that the directive which creates the 
challenge of complicity is lawful and coming from an otherwise legitimate government. This also 
needs to be unpacked a bit. In saying that it is a ‘lawful directive’ we are assuming that the 
directive is legally valid, in keeping with validity conditions for that medical professional’s legal 
system, that it is constitutional and was issued following proper legal procedures. In saying it is 
legally valid, we are not thereby assuming anything about the morality of the directive itself. 
Some might think this commits us to a legal positivist way of looking at the law.[17, 18] But it 
would also be consistent with some weaker versions of natural law (in which immoral positive 
laws are still legally valid, though defective).[19, 20] In saying that the government is ‘otherwise 
legitimate’, I simply mean to assume away cases in which the government is so morally defective 
that none of its directives can possibly obligate. We will see shortly that legitimacy is not an all-
                                                          
3 This assumption is very likely counterfactual. Where the physician’s profession garners a livelihood upon which 
others depend, threats to that livelihood certainly have moral implications for the physician’s non-professional 
duties. Similarly, threats to the physician’s person or liberty may have implications for the wellbeing or happiness of 
others. But we will bracket these considerations in order to focus on the conflict between the directive and the 
physician’s medical duties. 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
  4 
or-nothing affair when it comes to political obligation.4 By focusing only on those cases where it 
is possible for the government to issue morally binding directives, I am hoping to focus on the 
instances in which medical complicity is a moral conundrum for the medical professional. If the 
government was incapable of issuing morally binding directives, then its directive for the 
professional to do something against her better medical judgment could only give a prudential 
reason (e.g., to avoid sanction), which we have already assumed does not itself present a moral 
reason that needs to enter our consideration here. Furthermore, we would be back in the 
position of begging the question against the possibility of a morally binding obligation to be 
complicit. 
 The question is then essentially what could make a legal directive to a medical 
professional to act against her better medical judgment morally legitimate. The focus on 
legitimacy is apt because we are concerned precisely with what could be the moral justifications 
for compliance with these directives. That is, a concern for the conditions of legitimacy of a legal 
directive is one that focuses on its moral justifiability, its moral authority, what gives the 
commander a right to issue the directive and thereby give the subject the duty to comply.5[33, 34, 
35] Hence, we are not concerned with mere power (understood as the ability of the commander 
to get others to comply). Nor are we concerned with de facto authority understood as the belief 
that the commander has the right to command. We are concerned with what people are 
attempting to track with their judgments about legitimacy, rather than the beliefs that are a result 
of those judgments. Some might think that de facto authority is the only kind of authority that 
need concern us. Even if there is something that people are trying to get right in their beliefs 
about legitimacy, it is not something to which we have reliable access; we cannot be sure that 
                                                          
4 While Jospeh Raz distinguishes between political obligation and the obligation to obey the law, [21 p127] we will 
treat these as equivalent here, following the majority of the literature.[22 p217, agreeing with Raz but noting the 
prevalence of the conflation, 23] 
5 Some people suggest that the right to command and the duty to obey can come apart.[24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29] But 
we will follow Raz in seeing the right to issue commands and the duty to obey them on the part of the audience of 
those commands as two sides of the same coin.[30 p235, 31 p6, 32 p1012] 
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these judgments are ever correct. Hence, under this view, de facto authority is the only thing we 
can really talk about. But in asking when complicity might be morally justified, we are assuming 
already that there is an answer to this question that people can get right or wrong. We are asking 
for an analysis of what it is to be morally justified and not merely to be believed to be justified. 
Our question would otherwise be what makes people believe that complicity is morally justified, 
rather than what makes those beliefs correct or incorrect. In effect, it would all just be a matter 
of subjective opinions about legitimacy; there would be no right answer.6 Furthermore, if want 
therefore to say that our analysis of what might make medical complicity morally justified is 
tracking something other than the psychological fact of beliefs about that justification, we are 
thereby relying on the conceptual possibility that the directives demanding the complicity are 
themselves potentially morally legitimate.  
 To begin our discussion of the legitimacy of authority, we need to recognize first that 
authority comes in two flavours. Sometimes we use the word ‘authority’ to refer to the greater 
knowledge of an expert. Generally, when we think of the medical professional herself, we think 
of her as an authority on the subject of health and disease or injuries to the human body. When 
the physician gives a directive to a patient, we usually think of that as a form of advice, giving 
information about what course of action would be most beneficial to the patient. While we 
might take it quite seriously, we don’t usually conceive of the directive of the physician to the 
patient as akin to the orders of military commanders, parents, or government officials. In those 
latter cases we say instead that a person is ‘in authority’ or ‘in a position of authority’ rather than 
saying that the person is ‘an authority’ on a given subject – which is what we say of the physician. 
In the literature on authority this distinction is explained by saying that the authority of the 
expert is ‘theoretical’ or ‘epistemic’ in that the expert’s pronouncements give you reasons to 
                                                          
6 There are metaethical positions in which there can be no correct moral judgments. Some say that moral claims are 
not judgments at all, merely expressions of emotion [36, 37]; some say all such judgments are wrong [38, 39]; some 
say there are no moral truths on the basis of which such judgments can be true or false.[40, 41, 42] I admit I may be 
treating some or all of these metaethical positions as incorrect in making the assumptions I do in this paper. 
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believe a given piece of information or interpretation of information, while the authority of the 
commander is ‘practical’ or ‘deontic’ in that the commander is giving you reasons to act in 
certain ways.[30 p8, 43, 44 p399, 45] So the challenge of legitimating medical complicity is in 
navigating a clash between the practical authority of the state and the theoretical authority of the 
physician.  
 While this is an important distinction, especially for our purposes, a quick look at the 
authority of parents and of military commanders shows that sometimes the legitimacy of 
practical authority can be based on theoretical authority. That is, one reason among others that 
we might have for saying that parents have the right to give directives that ought to be obeyed by 
their children (where the children are old enough to bear this duty) is that parents know better 
than the children what is best for them. Similarly, military commanders are thought to be in a 
position of greater knowledge of the goals of military action and facts salient to the attainment of 
those goals. Even though they may not be directing their subordinates in ways that are best for 
those subordinates individually, we would still say that the subordinates have a duty to sacrifice 
their own interests for those of the wider community (assuming that the military action is itself 
justified), and that following those commands is the substance of that duty.  
A word of caution, however: to say that practical authority can be based on theoretical 
authority is not to say that it can be reduced to theoretical authority. If we were to say that 
practical authority is reduced to theoretical authority, [25 p14, 46] we would be saying that no 
one ever really gets the right to tell others what to do. Instead putative commanders are merely 
giving people information about what is in their interests or meets their pre-existing duties. This 
position is perfectly coherent and can likely be accommodated by the analysis of this paper, 
although it implies a certain kind of philosophical anarchism. If all instances of supposedly 
legitimate practical authority are merely instances of legitimate theoretical authority, then the 
commands of putative authorities are not giving their subjects any new reasons they didn’t 
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already have. The most they can do is inform them of pre-existing reasons to behave in certain 
ways. With this understanding, a legal directive, for example, is generally just informing us how 
to avoid sanction by telling us which behaviours will incur it. We will be engaging with a theory 
that holds what legitimates practical authority is its ability to get those subject to it to comply 
with the best balance of reasons. A view that reduces practical authority to theoretical authority 
is simply holding that that best balance of reasons cannot be changed by the issuance of the 
directive itself. But since it is very unlikely that a demand for the medical professional to act 
against her best medical judgment will be morally justified unless there is an already existing set 
of serious reasons to do so, it is highly likely that the legitimating conditions of such a demand 
will be the same whether we believe it possible for the commander to issue new practical reasons 
or only to report those pre-existing reasons. 
While there have been many attempts to justify the possibility of legitimate political 
authority throughout the ages, we will focus on a more contemporary theory, the service 
conception of authority advanced by Joseph Raz.[21, 30, 31, 32, 33, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52] Raz’s 
theory has a number of advantages. First of all, his theory is non-voluntarist in that it doesn’t 
require consent of the person subject to the directive for it to be legitimately authoritative.[53] 
Some might find it a bit surprising that I cite this as an advantage. But consider whether we really 
think that all instances of practical authority are only legitimate when the subject consents. I 
don’t think consent is necessary for parental authority to be legitimate. Similarly, I can imagine 
situations in which the authority of military commanders would be legitimate even if those 
subject to that authority were conscripted against their will. Finally, even when it comes to 
governments, we might wish to say generally that government authority is limited to 
governments that rule with the consent of the governed, but I’m not sure that is always the case. 
We can imagine situations in which, because of some national emergency threatening many lives, 
the directives of an otherwise authoritarian or undemocratic government become legitimate, at 
least when concerning that emergency and for its duration.  
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As a way of testing the idea of consent being unnecessary for legitimate authority, away 
from governmental situations, consider the following thought experiment owed to Edna 
Ullmann-Margalit.[54 p350-51] You are in a room with two doors, marked (on both sides of the 
door) ‘A’ and ‘B’ respectively, each on the opposite side of the room from the other. There are 
100 people inside the room and 100 people outside of the room, spread out relatively uniformly 
inside and outside the room. Because of some unspecified emergency, all 100 inside the room 
need to get out and all 100 outside the room need to get in. If everyone simply learned of the 
emergency at the same time, you can imagine what would happen: everyone would run to the 
nearest door and no one would be able to enter or leave. But now imagine someone jumps up on 
a table and says in a voice loud enough to be heard inside and outside, ‘Use door A to exit the 
room and use door B to enter the room!’ No one inside or outside the room consented to this 
person’s right to issue commands. Yet everyone now is under a moral duty to comply with that 
command as it solves the collective action problem caused by the emergency.  
Another advantage of Raz’s theory is that it legitimates authority in a piecemeal way. Just 
as in our thought experiment, we don’t imagine the person’s authority extending beyond the 
emergency or to matters not covering the emergency, there doesn’t seem to be a prima facie 
reason to think that once a government possesses legitimate authority, it must extend to all of 
the government’s directives. Again, we are conceiving of authority as a right to control the 
behaviour of others corresponding to a duty on their part to obey. It therefore seems more 
reasonable that the legitimacy of that authority is to be assessed on a directive-by-directive basis, 
rather than in a blanket way. Granted, we are used to thinking about government’s authority 
extending to all of its directives.7 But upon reflection, we don’t really think even the most 
legitimate government has a right to command whatever it wants. Many situations can 
                                                          
7 Raz captures this intuition by saying that governments claim that all of their legally valid directives are morally 
binding, but we assess that claim on a case-by-case basis. Each directive is to be assessed for legitimacy with regard 
to each subject each moment, such that the claim could be true of a given directive for me but not you, or true now 
for me but not in ten minutes for me.[33 p69] 
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undermine the legitimacy of a command for certain people and/or at certain times. Where a 
directive couldn’t have considered a certain exigency, we think we are in an exception to the 
legitimacy of that directive. Even if the law against violating posted speed limits did not include 
an exception for when you are rushing someone to the hospital, we would still believe that the 
law against speeding is not morally binding on the person rushing to the hospital. We might say 
that certain people are in situations of morally more pressing duties that justify their 
disobedience.  
One way to address this is to say that the directive is legitimate but outweighed by those 
other considerations. However, if we are serious about seeing the right to command and the duty 
to obey as opposite sides of the same coin here, then someone in a situation where his duty of 
obedience is outweighed is no longer bound by that duty. That would be akin to saying that the 
command was not issued with a right in that instance. A person to whom the duty no longer 
applies because of more pressing concerns is one for whom the command was illegitimate. If 
these considerations are leading us in the right direction, we would want a theory of legitimate 
practical authority that explains why a given directive might be legitimate for me but not for you, 
or legitimate for me now, but perhaps not in ten minutes. Raz’s theory does just that. 
Raz’s theory captures the idea that legitimate authority must be exercised for the sake of 
those subject to it, either in the service of their interests, or in the service of their pre-existing 
moral responsibilities, without making it depend upon their consent. After all, if we take 
seriously the value and requirements of autonomy, the only thing that could overcome the right 
to self-determination that is generated by that value is something that appeals to a value that is 
more basic or of greater import. Raz’s answer is to base the legitimization of authority on the 
overriding concern we have to act on the best balance of reasons. That is, the value of autonomy 
stems from the fact that we are generally in the best position to assess what is best for us, given 
our own personal ambitions, projects, and goals, which are themselves based upon our individual 
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talents, tastes, and desires, as well as our pre-existing moral duties. But all of those talents, 
desires, ambitions, goals and duties give us reasons to act in certain ways. Our talents and tastes, 
along with our pre-existing duties, give us reasons to adopt certain goals over others. When we 
decide which goals to adopt, we are trying to assess what the best balance of those reasons are. 
Once we adopt those goals, they give us further reasons about how to pursue those goals. We 
decide on the means to pursue those goals by again trying to assess the best balance of reasons 
that apply to us.  
If autonomy itself is generally subservient to the value of leading one’s life according to 
the best balance of reasons that applies to one, then it can and should bow out in situations 
where acting non-autonomously would aid in acting according to the best balance of reasons. 
This is where the service conception picks up. It says that the normal way to justify authority is 
to say that it is justified where obedience to it helps the subject conform better to the best 
balance of reasons that already apply to her, than she would be able to accomplish if left to her 
own devices. Raz calls this the ‘Normal Justification Thesis’ (NJT).[33 p53] 
Now one might justifiably think that sometimes it’s better for people to prioritize 
autonomy even at the risk of not acting in accord with the best balance of reasons. That is, there 
are some areas of human life where it is more important to make one’s own mistakes than it is 
for people to reach the right conclusion about what to do. Raz realizes this and gives two 
examples of where this is likely to be true: certain matters in which children need increasing self-
reliance (and so must be allowed to make their own mistakes in order to learn properly), and the 
decision about whether and whom to marry.[32 p1015-16] He therefore qualifies the NJT by 
saying that it is subject to what he calls an ‘independence condition’, such that the matter is not 
one in which it is more important for people to make mistakes than to get it right.[32 p1014, 33 
p57, 55 p1180] One might also wonder how these areas are determined. I’m not entirely sure 
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how to answer that but suspect it might have something to do with the balance of reasons 
requiring that some specific actions be the result of one’s own choices. 
Since the reasons on the basis of which we are ultimately justifying the authoritative 
directive here are the reasons that already apply to the subject, there is another condition that is 
generally necessary for the directive to be legitimate. That is the requirement that the directive be 
based upon (or at least reflect8) reasons that already apply to the target audience of the 
directive.[33 p47] Raz calls this the ‘dependence thesis’, conceiving of these particular pre-
existing reasons as ‘dependent reasons’ for the directive.[33 p41] Of course, those dependent 
reasons need not be ones the subject is aware of, or would agree with, or even that are in her 
interest (as reasons—usually moral—that apply to her can require a sacrifice on her part). 
 When a directive is legitimate for a given subject at a given point in time, Raz claims that 
it presents the subject with ‘pre-emptive reasons’.[33 p57] That is, when we imagine undertaking 
a decision procedure about a contemplated action, we would generally add up all of the pros and 
cons, thinking of each as a reason in favour or against the action, giving each a weight according 
to the strength of the consideration in favour or against. In a non-authoritative situation, if 
someone were to request that you undertake the action, that request would count as an 
additional reason in favour of the action, with a weight corresponding to how important it is to 
make the requester happy, how important it is to the requester that the action be done, etc. We 
might similarly say that if someone were to order you to undertake the action, that would count 
as some reason in favour of undertaking it, even if we might discount that reason because of 
thoughts that the person didn’t express his desire regarding the action in a very nice way. (Where 
the order comes from someone whom we wouldn’t think of having any right to order us around, 
                                                          
8 To say that the reasons for the directive must ‘reflect’ reasons that already apply to those subject to the directive is 
not to say that a legitimate directive cannot be based on reasons other than those applying to the subjects. But the 
actions required by the directive should be ‘justifiable by the reasons that apply to the subjects.’ That is, sometimes 
the authority may need to adopt ‘an indirect strategy’ for the subjects to comply with the best balance of reasons.[33 
p51] 
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we may very well count the order as a reason against the action as well.) But thinking about the 
dependence and normal justification theses a bit shows that when directives are legitimately 
authoritative, they are a bit different.  
In order for authoritative directives to perform the service that generally determines their 
legitimacy, they must pre-empt the subject’s reasons against the action commanded.9 They are 
authoritative to the extent that they pre-empt the reasons that the authority was meant to have 
considered in issuing the directive.[21 p140] That is, if legitimately authoritative directives were 
simply additional weighty reasons in favour of the action commanded, they couldn’t provide the 
service of helping the person subject to the directive to comply better with the best balance of 
reasons. She would be left balancing the reasons as she sees fit, putting the directive on the scales 
in favour of compliance. In order to help her to act according to the best balance of reasons that 
apply to her, the directive must exclude at least some of those reasons (the ones counting against 
the commanded action).[21 p140-41, 33 p61] 
Furthermore, since in order to be legitimately authoritative, the directive is already based 
upon a balancing of the reasons that apply to the subject (along with other considerations), to 
see the directive as simply a weighty reason (rather than seeing it as excluding some), would be to 
double count the reasons in favour of the action that the putative authority already accounted 
for. That is, a legitimate directive must be allowed to pre-empt the balancing of reasons that the 
subject would do (at least in determining the action, if not the deliberation), since otherwise 
seeing the directive as an additional reason would be to give undue weight to the reasons in 
favour of the action—they would appear a second time as the basis for the directive.[33 p58] 
                                                          
9 For Raz, to say that the directives pre-empt the subject’s reasons against the action commanded does not mean 
that the subject may not still deliberate upon or consider those reasons. The subject simply may not act upon 
them.[33 p39] 
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A legitimately authoritative directive, therefore, is a reason to act in conformity with the 
content of the directive, coupled with a reason to exclude certain reasons not to act in conformity 
with it. We exclude those reasons by not acting upon them. 
 
With this picture of legitimate practical authority in mind, let us return to the situation of 
the medical professional. Generally, the medical professional’s responsibility to her patient is to 
act always in the patient’s best interest in terms of the patient’s continued or recovered health or 
wellbeing. [56, 57, 58] An instance of complicity, we have seen, would be where the medical 
professional is not acting in the patient’s best interest as a result of other considerations, here the 
lawful directives of her government.  
As we’ve seen using Raz’s theory, even if we imagine a law that is general in that it is 
aimed at all medical professionals, or all medical professionals in a certain speciality, or in a 
certain circumstance, or dealing with a certain kind of patient, if that general law is legitimate at 
all, it may only be legitimate for a subset of those at whom it is aimed, and/or only for part of 
the time the law is in effect. It would generally depend upon whether the law is helping the 
medical professionals to conform better with the best balance of reasons that apply to them than 
they would be able to do on their own. 
Since we generally think that one of the highest responsibilities of the medical 
professional is to her patient, it would likely be a very high bar that would need to be overcome 
for a directive to act against that responsibility to be legitimate. The only thing that we usually 
think can contravene such a responsibility would be a more pressing responsibility, perhaps to 
another patient whose needs are more severe. Putting aside the government directive for a 
moment, two kinds of physicians come immediately to mind who must balance the 
considerations of others against the patient in front of them: emergency room doctors and 
epidemiologists. Emergency room doctors of course must work on a triage system. It is likely 
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that what is in the best interest of the patient in front of them at the moment is to be treated 
right away. However, if there are patients with greater needs waiting for treatment, we expect 
them to put aside the interests of this patient for the one with greater needs.[59, 60, 61, 62] 
While emergency room doctors are the ones we expect to confront this situation on a regular 
basis, we actually expect almost all medical professionals to act upon this principle, so long as the 
patient with greater needs is one that the particular professional can treat. Epidemiologists must 
confront a similar situation, but where the other people to be considered may not yet even be ill. 
They may be in a situation where little can be done for the patient in front of them, but by acting 
against that patient’s individual interests, a large number of other people may be prevented from 
becoming ill.[63, 64, 65] Indeed, this is one area in which a physician can function as a legitimate 
practical authority rather than as a theoretical authority. In ordering that a given patient be 
quarantined, for example, the epidemiologist is exercising practical authority rather than giving 
advice. This is an order that creates a duty (and one that, in most cases, the state is prepared to 
enforce). In that, they may be helping the individual infected patient conform better with the 
best balance of reasons facing him. It is likely his moral responsibility to forgo his freedom, and 
possibly sacrifice his health and even his life, to prevent others from becoming infected. The 
directive quarantining the patient is helping him to conform to that overriding reason. The 
epidemiologist is therefore also prioritizing those who are not in front of her for treatment or 
protection, over the patient immediately confronting her.  
Now we may be tempted to use emergency room physicians and the epidemiologists as 
models for when lawful government directives to act against the interests of patients are 
legitimate. That is, we might start by saying a government directive that is successfully protecting 
a much larger number from serious risks, or is redirecting the physicians’ efforts toward treating 
those confronting more serious threats to health, is a legitimate directive. It is likely that the 
government’s central position gives it access to information that the individual physician cannot 
obtain and so directives based on these considerations are helping those individual physicians to 
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conform better to the best balance of reasons than she would be able to do on her own. The 
problem is that this doesn’t look like complicity any more. That is, if we already think of the 
responsibilities of emergency room workers and epidemiologists as generalizable to all medical 
professionals when confronting similar situations (even if their speciality is not emergency 
medicine or epidemiology), then the directive for physicians of other kinds to sacrifice the 
interests of the patient in front of them is not a moral compromise of the kind that raises the 
issue of complicity. The directive is not asking the physician to do something that she doesn’t 
already have a direct medical responsibility to do (indeed, that is precisely why we imagine that 
the directive is legitimate). 
In order to reach complicity, therefore, we have to imagine that the directive is issued not 
for the sake of a greater medical need. Those will certainly be much harder to justify, but perhaps not 
impossible. First of all, it is clear that the considerations behind the government directive will 
have to be moral ones, in order to have a chance to be legitimate as against the physician’s 
responsibilities to the patient. We generally think of moral reasons as a kind of reasons that 
trumps other kinds of reasons. Since the physician’s responsibilities to the patient are themselves 
moral responsibilities, only moral reasons behind the government directive will have any chance 
of doing a better job of providing a better balancing of the best reasons for action in a given 
circumstance.  
One might imagine here that the physician’s oath, if one has been undertaken, is relevant 
here. After all, if we understand the oath to be a promise to treat patients a certain way, then that 
would be an additional moral consideration against acting in a way that goes against the 
physician’s best medical judgment of the patient’s interest. However, once the physician has the 
requisite skills to render aid to a patient, it would seem that the responsibilities to do so are 
already in place and that the oath doesn’t add anything to the moral picture.[66] Indeed, if we 
think of the oath as akin to a promise, it is not clear to whom the promise has been made: other 
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physicians, potential future patients, the physician herself? If the oath does have moral effect, it 
is likely only to magnify somehow the physician’s pre-existing duties, perhaps as against her 
other responsibilities. Whereas before undertaking the oath, she may have been entitled to 
discount certain responsibilities towards strangers, in favour of other responsibilities of slightly 
lesser absolute weight owed to friends and family, now perhaps she must put those strangers’ 
interests in a higher position. So, for example, while non-medical personnel may be permitted to 
refuse to render relatively minor aid to a stranger where doing so would necessitate missing his 
child’s piano recital, a medical professional who has undertaken certain professional oaths may 
not have the same moral permission. With these considerations in mind, we will put the oath 
aside in order to focus more broadly on the legitimizing conditions for government directives 
that any medical professional act against her better medical judgment, given that not all of those 
professionals will have taken such an oath. 
We have seen that for a government directive to be a legitimately authoritative reason for 
the physician to engage in complicity, it would have to be based on moral reasons that do not 
stem from a pre-existing moral duty on the part of the professional to render medical aid to 
others. This is not to say that medical considerations cannot play into the reasons for the 
directive at all. But they can’t be the same medical considerations that would be directly 
applicable to the physician such that they would already entail that her medical obligation is to 
act against the interests of the patient in front of her. 
To explore the contours of such a case more precisely, we will resort to a time-honoured 
technique in moral theory, the thought experiment.[67] But the contours of our thought 
experiment will not render it the kind difficult to imagine ever taking place in reality. Imagine the 
legitimate government is concerned about public order in a way that dwarfs its ability to respond 
to threats. A long-time brutal dictator has recently been deposed and a democratic government 
has been installed. The problem is that this dictator was very popular among a minority of the 
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country. In one area in particular, the dictator’s policies meant for particular hardship and 
oppression of the majority group in order to keep the minority in that area in relative comfort. 
Now this dictator has an illness that is serious and life-threatening, but treatable with very 
expensive procedures that have not yet begun in earnest. Overthrowing the dictator was possible 
because of his need to seek treatment and was done while he was in the care of his doctors. 
Allowing the treatment will induce further hardship for the majority in that particular area. 
Because of the notoriety of the case and the access of the now-free press, all of this is known 
and believed across the country, although the tense political situation in that particular area is not 
widely known. It becomes apparent that if the physician treats her patient, there will be an 
insurrection in that part of the country and many people will die. Mainly, these will be members 
of the minority who had benefited from the policies of the dictator, but that includes many 
young children recently born during the dictator’s regime, which encouraged the minority in that 
area to have as many children as possible. While it would usually be the government’s 
responsibility to keep order and not the physician’s, this newly elected government is quite 
fragile, came to power initially dependent upon the votes of the majority, and does not yet have 
much independent police power in that area, relying instead on the support of the majority of the 
local population. The government would not be able to put down the insurrection or prevent it, 
and we are sure that many innocent people will die as a result. Furthermore, the insurrection, if 
successful will institute another unjust, authoritarian regime with a racist leader in that part of the 
country, although this time the policies will be directed against the minority that had benefited 
before. Giving in to the demands of those threatening the insurrection will lead to so much 
injustice that resisting the insurrection would clearly be the more just option. If we were to 
imagine that the government had the patient in question under its direct control, we would say 
that it would be the correct course of action for the government not to allow the patient to 
undergo treatment if it would lead to the insurrection. But instead, the patient is not (yet) in 
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government custody and its now re-instituted laws do not allow the government to take custody 
of any person currently under medical care for a serious illness.  
In such a case, it would seem that the government’s lawful directive to the physician not 
to treat the patient would be helping the physician to conform to the best balance of reasons. 
Furthermore, the information that not treating the patient is in conformity with the best balance 
of reasons is not something that the physician is likely to have direct access to in such a situation, 
and so the government’s directive is helping the physician to conform to the best balance of 
reasons that apply to her. Finally, it still appears to be a case of complicity since, while the 
physician refraining from treating the patient will save more lives, those lives are not under 
immediate medical threat. 
We might be bothered by the thought that risk to the lives of the innocents is still a 
medical consideration and hence this might still not be a case of complicity. While it does seem 
true that once the fighting breaks out, there would be a medical need to treat the injured, it is not 
the kind of risk that would count as a medical consideration before the fact. If it helps to sharpen 
the example on this front, imagine that the insurrection would explode a device that would 
vaporize all of the threatened innocents in an instant, leaving no injuries. In such a situation, the 
threat to life is not one that medical expertise can mitigate directly. While we all share the duty to 
minimize the loss of life, the special duty of medical professionals kicks in when their expertise is 
necessary to minimize that loss of life. Here, there would be no way that their expertise is being 
called upon to minimize the loss of life and so their duty would be the same as everyone else’s. 
The point of the thought experiment is to show that it is possible for that more general duty to 
still be greater than the physician’s professional medical duty, even though we usually consider 
the physician’s medical duty to come before her other moral duties. 
We generally think it is the duty of governments to deal with such threats, where 
possible, and possibly to negotiate around them. It is usually the government’s responsibility to 
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do so without interfering with the physician and her patients. But the thought experiment shows 
the possibility of a legitimate directive that requires complicity on the part of the physician. 
Again, a virtue of Raz’s service conception is that it legitimates such directives on a piecemeal 
basis. So, it might legitimately obligate certain physicians but not others, perhaps on the basis of 
whom they happen to be treating and what the particular wider implications of that treatment 
might be.  
Now one complaint that might arise is that it is hard to imagine a law being drafted that 
would cover such a situation and be legitimate. That is, if a law were to direct doctors not to treat 
patients when ordered not to do so by certain government officials given the threat of certain 
kinds of insurrection, it is very unlikely for such a law to be generally legitimate (although, ex 
hypothesi, still legally valid). The flip-side of the advantage of Raz’s piecemeal approach, however, 
is that even a generally illegitimate law could be legitimate for certain people at certain times. 
This is one reason that even an authoritarian government may come to have greater legitimacy in 
times of disasters and emergencies, and more democratic governments may justifiably take 
authoritarian steps in such emergencies. (Consider whether you think Lincoln’s suspension of 
habeas corpus during the US Civil War was illegitimate.)  
One additional issue that should be mentioned is how the physician is supposed to assess 
the legitimacy of the directive. This is where the clash between the physician’s medical expertise 
and the government’s central position becomes most stark. While Raz says that the legitimacy of 
a directive must be ‘knowable’ by its subjects,[21 p147-48] that does not mean that it must be 
something about which the subject would always be correct. The key is to remember that 
legitimacy is a fact about whether the directive is capturing the best balance of reasons that 
applies to the subject. It is likely to be very difficult to assess this, although if the subject were in 
possession of the same facts as the putative authority, the idea is that a clear-thinking subject 
would have reached the same conclusion. The physician has greater knowledge about the 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
  20 
condition and needs of her patient. It may be that the government doesn’t have access to that 
information but has other information that militates against the treatment that the physician is 
contemplating. Each, we assume, is lacking at least some of the information possessed by the 
other. But there is still a fact about whether the directive is justified based on the correct 
balancing of those considerations. While neither may have had sufficient information to perform 
that balancing perfectly, it is possible that the government’s considerations would cover a wide 
range of potential patients and conditions. Where those considerations wouldn’t yield to the 
interests of a given patient, then the directive would be illegitimate, even though the government 
wouldn’t know that and would have still issued the directive.  
Another problem is that intuitions might differ about our though experiment. It is true 
that those with less consequentialist moral intuitions may think that the physician’s duty is fixed 
by the patient’s interest regardless of the outcome. In the starkest form, we can lay this intuition 
aside as begging the question against the possibility of ever allowing for legitimate medical 
complicity. But as long as one’s moral beliefs allow for the possibility of conflicting duties, it 
does appear possible for certain kinds of more general duties to come into conflict with the 
physician’s medical duties in a way that those more general duties still win out. 
 
What we have seen is that it is possible to justify medical complicity in the face of a 
government directive not to exercise a physician’s best medical judgment with regard to a given 
patient. While such cases are likely quite rare, complicity would be morally justified where the 
non-medical considerations upon which the directive was based are ones that would themselves 
undermine the physician’s pre-existing moral duty to treat the patient.  
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